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Was Grotius’s Teleology of Punishment Predestined to Fail?
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Abstract:
Most readers believe Grotius failed to refute Socinus in De satisfactione. This paper
argues that Grotius's failure was one of reception rather than argument. It is possible to
read De satisfactione as Grotius adverted: a genuine (if subtle) concept of satisfaction,
and a defence of the (small-c) catholic faith. Grotius does reject a necessitarian identical
satisfaction, in which a repayment is equal to a debt, but like Aquinas, he embraces a
teleological equivalent satisfaction, in which a punishment fits a crime. Yet Grotius’s
catholic theory was predestined not to persuade a wartime Continental audience whose
centre had not held and which sought definitive distinctions from the Roman church. His
attempt to forge a broad middle way would succeed only later in Britain.
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Grotius’s 1617 De satisfactione Christi is often considered a failure on several counts.
Composed during the tumultuous 1610s, Grotius sought through it to placate his CounterRemonstrant opponents. Yet Grotius would see little immediate relief of the political and
physical danger that threatened him; indeed, that peril would only increase. The CounterRemonstrant party would succeed in convening the Synod of Dort, and their political
allies would greet its conclusion by imprisoning Grotius. Grotius also sought in De
satisfactione to demonstrate his fidelity to catholic Christianity, and thus to save his
reputation from Socinian taint. In this he was scarcely more successful. His CounterRemonstrant opponents did not cease to charge him with Socinian sympathy; they only
intensified their charges. Finally, Grotius surely must have hoped that his Atonement
theory would gain currency in the Dutch church and beyond. Yet his theory won few
adherents in Holland, and scarcely more throughout the Continent. Few apologists or
preachers there today rehearse the Governmental theory in preparation to evangelize.
If Grotius’s work was a failure in practical terms, perhaps it might be a philosophical
success as an argument on its intrinsic merits. Yet here Grotius’s (few) academic readers
are scarcely more convinced. Jacqueline Lagrée sees Grotius as failing on account of a
judicial methodology, one that ostensibly ignores the healing of the soul. As a result, his
rigid conception of law and punishment merely looks backward to cancel out sin, rather
than moving forward to promote virtue.1 Edwin Rabbie, editor of the first English edition
in a century, describes De satisfactione as ‘brilliant’ and worthy of admiration. Yet he
then proceeds to presume his ‘readers will agree with the present consensus of scholars
that the work is a failure, because it does not prove what it purports to prove.’ He lauds
Grotius’s ability to fail at such a high level – a backhanded compliment whose praise
would perhaps resonate better if it did not seem the loudest offered in the mainstream
literature.2 Hans Blom acknowledges the centrality of the work to Grotius’s oeuvre.
However, in an agenda-setting argument, he deepens Rabbie’s judgment by arguing that
the work is not primarily a work of theology, but rather the foundation for a radical
Enlightenment politics – a position that connotes Locke’s Socinian heterodoxy. In his
reading, Grotius severs the connection between offence and punishment, and fails to
establish punishment by reference to the moral value of faithfulness, thus reducing the
Atonement to inscrutable Divine mystery.3
This essay argues that while Grotius’s work was a failure on the practical count, it was
not actually a failure on its theoretical merits. Grotius’s failure owes more to the
circumstances of his time and to the subtleties of his argument than to the content of his
theology. It is indeed possible to read De satisfactione precisely as Grotius adverted: a
catholic defense of Christ’s satisfaction for human sin.
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Jacqueline Lagrée, ‘Droit et théologie dans le De Satisfactione Christi de Hugo Grotius, in Politique,
Droit, et Théologie chez Bodin, Grotius et Hobbes, ed. by Luc Foisneau (Paris: Kimé, 1997), pp. 208-12.
2
Edwin Rabbie, ‘Introduction’, in Hugo Grotius, Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi (The
Satisfaction of Christ), ed. and intro. by Edwin Rabbie, trans. Hotze Mulder (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990), p.
2. As he says, ‘they will still admire the book: it takes a scholar of Grotius’ stature to fail at such a high
level.’
3
Hans W. Blom, ‘Grotius and Socinianism’, in Socinianism and Arminianism: Antitrinitarians, Calvinists,
and cultural exchange in seventeenth-century Europe, ed. by Jan Rohls and Martin Mulsow (Leiden: Brill,
2005), pp. 122, 125-6.
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What is meant by ‘catholic’? Early in De satisfactione, Grotius purports to advance
those beliefs which, ‘as derived from sacred Scripture, the church of Christ has until now
upheld with unshaken faith.’4 He thus emphasizes as catholic both long usage within
Christendom and Scriptural foundations. This understanding of catholicity reflects his
approach in other works. For instance, in both Meletius and De veritate, he sets out to
expound the long-used commonalities between ‘all Christian nations’ (Eastern, Roman,
and Reformed), rather than adjudicating areas of divergence. He identifies as catholic
those doctrines that all three branches can agree on, despite their bitter divisions on other
matters.5 Moreover, in De imperio, Grotius emphasizes early church foundations by
praising the early church for its unity and harmony, achieved through a broad latitude on
inessentials rather than through expanding the realm of orthodoxy on such indifferent
matters.6 Finally, throughout his corpus he lionizes the early catholic church as a period
of great learning, and heavily cites harmonizers of faith and reason such as Lactantius,
Ambrose, Augustine, and John Chrysostom. Following their example, he provides
philosophical reasons in De veritate for the possibility of the Resurrection of Christ and
of the body after death.7
To Grotius, the catholic doctrine of the Atonement is that of substitutionary
atonement. This doctrine sees human sin as an obstacle to God’s favour. Such sin
requires satisfaction through the shedding of blood, in order to make amends and to
appease God’s wrath against sin. Christ’s passion and death is that satisfaction for sin:
‘the punishment of our crimes was exacted of him’.8 In bearing this burden, Christ
upholds the demonstration of divine justice. When God accepts this sacrifice, God
becomes reconciled to humanity, liberating humanity from eternal death, and making
salvation possible.9 By this standard, both the satisfaction theory of Anselm-Aquinas and
the penal substitution theory of Calvin are catholic, even though their details differ from
each other (and from Grotius). What matters most is their conclusion, in which they
agree, rather than their intermediate premises, over which they disagree. By contrast, the
theory of Socinus is not catholic, because it rejects Christ’s passion and death as
satisfactory.
Thus, despite the idiosyncracies of De satisfactione, its method and content both meet
Grotius’ test of catholicity. Grotius may differ from other catholic theories by
interpreting Scripture through a philosophical-juridical hermeneutic rather than a more
theological approach. Nonetheless, this method is not antithetical to catholic Christianity,
whose many branches throughout time have unwaveringly upheld a Gospel that begins by
4

Hugo Grotius, Defensio Fidei Catholicae de Satisfactione Christi (The Satisfaction of Christ), ed. and
intro. Edwin Rabbie, trans. Hotze Mulder (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1990), I.1, pp. 90-1.
5
‘So the difference of opinions that is amongst Christians, cannot hinder their agreement in the principal
things, that is, those commands, by which we have now recommended the Christian religion: And the
certainty of these appears from hence, that those who being highly enraged against one another, having
sought for matter of disagreement, never ventured to go so far as to deny, that these were the precepts of
Christ.’ Hugo Grotius, The Truth of the Christian Religion, ed. and intro. Maria Rosa Antognazza, trans.
John LeClerc (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2012), II.17, p. 125.
6
Hugo Grotius, De Imperio Summarum Potestatum Circa Sacra (On the Power of Sovereigns Concerning
Religious Affairs), critical edition with introduction, translation, and commentary by Harm-Jan Van Dam
(Boston: Brill, 2001), V.9, pp. 268-75; VI.9, pp. 308-13; VIII.6, 380-83.
7
Christian Religion, II.7, pp. 105-6; II.10, pp. 110-3.
8
De satisfactione, I.59, pp. 128-31.
9
See De satisfactione, I.2, pp. 90-1; I.39, pp. 114-5; I.59, pp. 128-31; VII.1, pp. 208-9.
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asserting the harmony of faith and reason.10 Likewise, while one must concede that
Grotius’s concept of satisfaction is not the Calvinist (and Kantian) deontological-juridical
conception, in which Christ’s death exactly pays the penalty, it is nonetheless a genuine
teleological-political conception of satisfaction, in which Christ’s death is the most fitting
punishment for human redemption. Grotius’s teleological hermeneutic of fittingness
rather than necessity is no different than another of the standard catholic theories: that of
Aquinas.
Yet if Grotius’s work is a genuine theoretical defence of the catholic faith, its practical
failure remains. Indeed, the grounds for its theoretical success may have helped to
produce its practical failure. First, Grotius’s attempt to persuade on a neutral
philosophical basis, one available to Protestant, Roman Catholic, and perhaps even
nonbeliever alike, was unlikely to sway any of these groups. Second, his belief in the
potential efficacy of the Atonement for the entire church throughout time and space gave
few rhetorical benefits to a small and distinct Dutch nation. Finally, his less-tangible
language of prudence was unlikely to persuade a public seeking precise language of
necessity for which to fight. The centre could not hold in the Netherlands (or on the
Continent), as each side sought unambiguous and definitive distinctions from its
adversaries in a time of war. For this reason, Grotius’s attempt to forge a broad middle
way was successful only in Britain. It was likely predestined to fail – as Grotius already
seemed to know – in Continental Europe.
1. De Satisfactione: The Quest for Satisfactory Punishment11
Grotius wrote De satisfactione during a decade personally productive but also politically
portentous. The Calvinist-Arminian religio-political conflict was heating up, and Grotius
did not shrink from the fray. By 1615, he faced regular charges of Socinianism from the
Counter-Remonstrant party. But a study of De satisfactione does far more than to simply
illustrate Grotius’s historical situation. Indeed, if Grotius simply meant it as a speech-act
to rehabilitate his reputation among Calvinists, he chose a rather curious approach: a
detailed treatise, one referencing jurisprudence, citing pagan sources, and declining to
engage with Anselm and Calvin. But this impractical approach permits Grotius to
explore his philosophy of punishment, which reveals his surprising affinities with the
catholic tradition that he professes.
Grotius begins his theory of the Atonement by reaffirming that Christ does not remove
human sin, but indeed bears it. Sin brings a punishment (poena) that cannot be waived,
although the weight of sin’s burden can be transferred to Christ.12 This punishment for
human sin cannot be waived because God has created the universe according to this
necessary and unchanging moral law. Thus far, these basic premises mark Grotius as
defending the catholic understanding of substitutionary Atonement, but not yet as
offering a distinct catholic theory.

10

John 1.1: ‘In the beginning was logos, and logos was with God, and logos was God’ (King James
Version).
11
See also Jeremy Geddert, Hugo Grotius and the Modern Theology of Freedom: Transcending Natural
Rights (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 174-82.
12
De satisfactione, I.20-6, pp. 100-5.
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Grotius’s first distinct premise is this: the Atonement is not a matter of civil law, but a
matter of criminal punishment. Humanity is not a defendant owing a liability to God the
plaintiff. Rather, humanity stands convicted of a crime before God’s moral-political
government. Humanity has not taken something from God; rather, humanity has
offended against God.13 In other words, Grotius employs not the commercial language of
a payment but the moral language of a crime.
Grotius’s second distinct premise follows from the first: God does not hold a private
relationship to the sinner, as that of an economic creditor, but a public relationship to all
of humanity, as that of a governor.14 Sin is not simply a matter of an individual having
offended against God; rather, it is the matter of a human race having sinned against the
entire moral-political order of which God is ruler.15
By framing the Atonement within a public criminal law paradigm rather than a private
civil law one, Grotius imposes on the right-holder a duty. If the Atonement were a civil
law matter of debt repayment, God the creditor would possess a right against the goods of
the debtor, but no corresponding duty to claim them. Hence, God could simply release
the debtor for any reason – or for no reason at all. (According to Grotius, this is
Socinus’s position.) By contrast, in a criminal law case, the right-holder is the governor.
However, his right is only a right to pursue the pre-existing purposes of punishment.
Grotius here identifies these purposes as ‘the preservation of order and an example,’16
and later expands clarifies them in IBP as correction, example, and satisfaction.17
For this reason, the governor’s right is in fact a duty to the future of the society that he
or she governs. When the wrongdoer commits a crime, he or she does not primarily
offend against an individual, but against the entire commonwealth. The harm to the
public realm explains why the state and not the immediate victim brings the charges.18
13

De satisfactione, II.16, pp. 142-3.
De satisfactione, II.1-5, pp. 132-5.
15
In his fine article ‘Grotius and Socinianism’ Blom reads De satisfactione with sensitivity, notes its
centrality to Grotius’s jurisprudence, and traces its seeming discrepancies with De Iure Praedae and De
Iure Belli ac Pacis [= IBP] (see pp. 135-7). One such apparent discrepancy is Grotius’s insistence in De
satisfactione, II.5, pp. 134-7 that punishment requires a superior authority, which he appears to jettison in
the later IBP. In IBP, Grotius states that, prior to the institution of government, every individual not guilty
of a crime has the natural right (i.e. moral authority) to punish those guilty of that crime, even if the
punisher and punished share an equalitarian relationship rather than a superior-subordinate one. Thus, he
seems to suggest the pre-existence of an informal human moral authority that must be satisfied through
punishment. Only after those individuals consensually delegate their natural moral authority to the
government does the government acquire exclusive punishing authority; only now does the state organize
and codify the pre-existing human moral authority into a governing authority. Yet unlike human
government, God’s government does not come into being through consent; it is more akin to Grotius’s
parental authority. There is never a pre-existing condition prior to the institution of Divine government
(much like a child never exists prior to the punishing authority of his father). This suggests that the natural
human moral authority to punish prior to human government is only the right to uphold informal human
moral authority; there can be no natural human punishing authority to satisfy the integrity of God’s moral
authority. For this reason, the insistence on punishment by a superior in De satisfactione need not be
inconsistent with natural human punishing authority in IBP, because the former speaks of uncreated divine
government and the latter of consensual human government.
16
De satisfactione, II.16, pp. 142-3.
17
Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. by Richard Tuck, from the Edition by Jean Barbeyrac [=
IBP] (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2005), II.20.4.1, p. 956; II.20.5.1-3, pp. 959-61; II.20.6.1, p. 963.
Grotius explicitly rejects as purposes not only revenge but also retribution.
18
De satisfactione, II.6-2.8, pp. 136-9.
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Hence, the governor must address the criminal affront to the dignity, integrity, and
credibility of the political order that he or she is responsible to rebuild and protect going
forward. The governor cannot simply waive the punishment. Should he or she fail to
redress this affront to the dignity of the law, he or she will encourage other potential
criminals to act likewise.
One might thus conclude that Grotius licenses punishment in order to uphold the
community. Yet in doing so, he cannot help but also address the intention of the
individual. Unlike debt repayment, which simply requires the debtor to return the goods,
criminal punishment addresses the criminal’s intention and seeks to change or at least
deter his or her future objectives. As Grotius says, ‘the cause of punishment is the
wrongness of the act, not that anything is lacking to me’ – or presumably that anything is
lacking to the community. Hence, when criminal punishment addresses the community’s
sense of trust, law, and order, it promotes the moral faithfulness of the individual.19 For
this reason, the treason of the criminal cannot stand: God must testify to the goodness of
his moral order. Satisfaction is necessary.20
Yet satisfaction for a crime differs from satisfaction of a debt. As Grotius states in
IBP, satisfaction is not a matter of revenge or even of retribution. Rather, satisfaction
seeks to prevent the victim from being disrespected and thus similarly maltreated in the
future.21 But in this case, the ‘victim’ to be satisfied is not an individual creditor, or even
the immediate target of the crime. Rather, as he says in De satisfactione, ‘the order of
things and the public good function as creditor.’22
But how can one satisfy this communal ‘creditor’? In debt repayment, the debtor
satisfies the creditor by providing a remedy that is the exact inverse of the liability; in
fact, it undoes the existing liability. But in criminal punishment, how can an exact
punishment ever undo a crime? A crime is not a thing (such as a debt) that can be
returned; it is an action that cannot be undone.23 The closest analogue to undoing a crime
would be the punishment of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. But this would (in
the words of Gandhi) only leave the world blind and toothless. For this reason,
punishment differs from debt repayment, in which ‘the very nature of the thing
determines the method and amount’; rather, punishment ‘can only be determined by a
free act of will.’24
Thus, crime (or sin) does not call for identical satisfaction (solutio eiusdem), such as
the deontological equal and opposite transfer of an object (much less the equal and
opposite commission of the crime). Rather, crime calls for equivalent satisfaction
(solutio tantidem), which we might define as the teleological striving to publicly respect

19

De satisfactione, II.10, pp. 138-41. For a counterpoint, see Blom, ‘Grotius and Socinianism,’ p. 139.
De satisfactione, II.3-5, pp. 132-5; II.13, pp. 140-1; V.15, pp. 182-3. In this sense, Grotius is consistent
from De satisfactione to IBP. For a counterpoint, see Christian Gellinek, Hugo Grotius (Boston: Twayne,
1983).
21
IBP II.20.5.1, pp. 959-60; II.20.10.2-7, pp. 977-83.
22
De satisfactione, II.19, pp.144-5.
23
Indeed, Grotius’s implicit recognition foreshadows elements of contemporary chaos theory, popularized
in the example of a butterfly flapping its wings in Brazil and causing a tornado in Texas. The effect of
something as small as a butterfly cannot be undone, but only countered.
24
De satisfactione, II.11, pp. 140-1.
20
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and honour the axiological purposes of human moral-political existence.25 Criminal
satisfaction is not a thing that can be measured with exact correspondence to the crime,
but an action that carries forward indefinitely to meet the effects of the crime.
Furthermore, the equivalent satisfaction of criminal punishment does not deal in objects,
but rather with personal subjects who are never identical from one to another. This
personal element renders equivalent satisfaction especially appropriate to the Christian
for whom the fullest manifestation of truth is not a literal set of objective commands but
the subjective person of Christ.26 Christ does not issue a new set of commands; rather, he
personally exemplifies the spirit of the law that underlies the old commands.
The third unique premise of Grotius’s theory is this: God’s specific ordinance
stipulating death as the penalty for human sin is not an act of Creation. In other words, it
is not like the aforementioned immutable natural law that sin in general must be
punished. Rather, it is a positive ordinance of God as moral Governor of the universe. It
is ‘less properly natural’, as it does not partake of necessity, but rather is ‘appropriate’ or
‘fitting’ (convenientia), as it has a ‘harmony with nature’.27 Such positive ordinances do
not have an ‘inflexible rectitude’; instead, a different punishment might be ‘very fitting to
the nature and order of things.’
However, God’s positive law can only be altered (presumably to provide equivalent
satisfaction) if there is a good cause to do so, and not for any ‘unimportant reason’.28
Fortunately, the maintenance of God’s government permits – and actually calls for – such
a dispensation. God’s initial law commanding the death penalty for sin was surely the
best way to deter sin. After all, the supreme penalty of death ought to function as the
strongest possible disincentive toward sin. However, after Adam’s sin, and the
consequent sin of the rest of humanity, this high-stakes punishment paradoxically now
functions as the very worst disincentive. If every person tainted by original sin now faces
the gallows, why should anyone act virtuously or practice religion between now and that
inevitable eternal death? There would be no relationship between any person’s future
acts (virtuous or vicious) and their happiness or suffering in the hereafter.29 Of course,
the person’s virtuous acts and worship of God would still be intrinsically worthwhile.
But as original sin indicates, intrinsic motives are not perfectly sufficient to motivate
human action; if it were otherwise, Adam would not have sinned, and there would be no
need for Atonement in the first place. Because humans are always at least somewhat
motivated by extrinsic considerations of punishment, they would thus cease to act

25

De satisfactione,VI.16, pp. 196-7; VI.29, pp. 204-5; Edwards A. Park et al, eds., Bibliotheca Sacra, Vol.
23 (London: Trubner and Company, 1879), p. 645. See also Geddert, Hugo Grotius, pp. 126-8, 183-4.
26
Indeed, in contrast to the Qur’an, much of Christian Scripture consists not of commandment but of
history, narrative and parable.
27
De satisfactione, III.6-3.12, pp. 152-7; See also IBP, Prol. 8, pp. 85-6; Hugo Grotius, letter to Willem de
Groot, 18 May 1615, in Herbert F. Wright, Some Less Known Works of Hugo Grotius (Leiden: Brill, 1928),
pp. 208-10, BW I.405 (pp. 389-391).
28
De satisfactione, III.12, pp. 156-7. Grotius outlines other reasons to pardon (or not to pardon) in IBP
(see II.20.4.1, p. 956; II.20.22.1, pp. 996-7; II.20.23-27, pp. 998-1002; II.20.36, pp. 1015-7). Indeed, as
Grotius clarifies in De satisfactione, II.16, pp. 142-3, God’s action in the Atonement is that of clemency
(indulgentia), not liberality (facilitate): it apparently corresponds to Grotius’s second category in De
Aequitate, not his third.
29
This argument appears to echo that of Diodotus in Thucydides’ Mytilenean debate.
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according to virtue and religion if ultimate punishment were guaranteed.30 Hence, if God
continued to enforce this strict initial law, he would fatally paralyze the workings of his
own moral government – a result entirely opposite to the purposes of punishment. This
ultimate punishment would (ironically) produce the same effect as would the complete
release from punishment that violates God’s natural law as Creator.
Hence, God must determine a punishment that best balances the mathematical
extremes of absolute punishment and absolute mercy. (Grotius’s only element of
deontological necessity is that God must act with teleological prudence: when one says
that ‘God must do this’, what is properly meant is that ‘it is proper for God to do this’.)31
How can God find a golden mean that best shows displeasure with sin and yet provides
hope of salvation? He does so by prudently ordaining Christ’s substitutionary
Atonement, which accomplishes both. On the one hand, when the sinless Christ suffers
and dies, he shows to humanity the infinite seriousness of sin: ‘Man sees the price that
matches his sins.’32 (Indeed, Christ’s equivalent satisfaction is no lesser a punishment
than human damnation would be: while the punishment of one man for many may appear
quantitatively lesser, the punishment of the Son of God for man is in fact qualitatively far
greater. What is relaxed is not the punishment, but the strictness of the law.33) On the
other hand, Christ’s substitutionary punishment makes salvation possible for those who
accept it.34 Hence, God the governor attains the most prudent possible extrinsic balance
of fear of punishment and hope of gain. In Grotius’s view, Socinus’ nonsubstitutionary
theory does not do so.
What is more, God the Son’s loving sacrifice also inspires in humanity the best
possible intrinsic motives for virtue. Indeed, through Christ, God’s forgiveness now
becomes an active virtue. God must do more than simply passively not collect on his
debt, as in the Socinian conception; God the Son actively deigns to become human, to
suffer and to die. This active example of divine virtue then inspires active human virtues.
By adding such intrinsic motives, God also prudently attains the best possible
maximization of extrinsic and intrinsic motives: the fear of God and the love of God.35
30

‘If eternal death were to fall upon all, religion would totally have perished through despair of happiness.’
De satisfactione, V.4, pp. 176-7.
31
De satisfactione, II.17, pp. 142-3.
32
Hugo Grotius, Meletius, ed. and trans. by Guillaume H. M. Posthumus Meyjes (New York: Brill, 1988),
§ 47, p. 117.
33
This echoes Grotius’s statements in IBP II.20.28, pp. 1002-3 and II.20.32, pp. 1010-2 that a governor
may punish according to desert, which may call for a more severe punishment than that set out in the
positive law. Here the strictness of the law is also relaxed, as the punishment does not strictly follow the
law, but this does not mean that the punishment is thereby lighter.
34
De satisfactione, V.12, pp. 180-1. One might point out that De satisfactione is premised on the
impossibility of full pardon without satisfaction (as Socinus advocates), while IBP and De Aequitate seem
to differ by taking seriously the idea of pardon. Yet perhaps even this apparent fundamental divergence is
not so wide. De Satisfactione argues that God cannot simply pardon without satisfaction. Yet in rejecting
the ‘exact correspondence’ theory it does imply that at least some of the exact punishments will be
pardoned. Likewise, IBP and De Aequitate argue the human governor might pardon some criminals from
punishment – but not all criminals. When the respective governments of God and man view sin and crime
as a whole, sin and crime in general must be punished, but not all specific sins and crimes must be
punished with the specific punishment that they call for. This enables vicarious punishment, which Grotius
defends and identifies in both the theological and human realms.
35
In De satisfactione, IV.21, pp. 170-3, Grotius then further emphasizes the point and widens his audience
with an example from antiquity. The ancient Greek lawgiver Zaleucus had mandated a strict law that
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Hence, when God provides the best extrinsic and intrinsic motives for future virtue,
God the governor does not aim to undo sin (or crime), but rather to redeem it.36 He aims
to inspire future virtue in humanity. Thus, even Divine punishment must look forward
rather than backward.37 One might, of course, pause here to ask how Grotius can justify
hell. Unlike purgatory, hell is a place of permanent punishment that looks backward and
thus can never produce virtue and its rewards. If all punishment is forward-looking,
would this not compel Grotius to a proto-Unitarian universal salvation? On the contrary,
Grotius avoids this conclusion by outlining in IBP one judicious exception to forwardlooking punishment. This exception is God’s final judgment at the end of time. At the
end of time, it becomes unintelligible to look ahead to a temporal future. Here and only
here can God punish retributively according to pure desert, rather than punishing to
promote community integrity and consequent individual faithfulness. (Indeed, one might
say that any mathematically retributive punishment already exists outside of time,
because its deontological dictates are grounded in eternal and person-independent natural
law rather than in the positive law or prudence that deals with individuals.38) But
although this ‘end-of-time’ punishment now looks backward rather than forward and has
no reference to the future of the community, it need not be inscrutable, because it now
(finally) follows the necessitarian ‘exact correspondence’ theory.39 In any case, those
who fail to profess faith in Christ’s Atonement will fail to benefit in the future from his
satisfaction and example, and at the last judgment must therefore be treated according to
their inherent sinful desert. Grotius need not reference this ‘end-of-time’ exception in De
satisfactione, because he is dealing there with the Atonement of the believing church
rather than the final judgment of the unbelieving.
2. Aquinas and the catholic Grotius
Many observers understand Grotius to discard catholicity when he departs from the
‘exact correspondence’ theory. For instance, Nellen argues that ‘like Socinus, [Grotius]
could not regard satisfaction as payment in full; but this was the very point on which he
had set out to refute the heretic.’40 And yet not all catholic Atonement theories – those
defending the satisfaction of Christ – employ necessitarian language. In fact, the
opposite is true. In particular, Grotius’s theory displays surprising commonalities with
the most widely-held of the catholic theories both then and now: the “satisfaction” theory.
The satisfaction theory originates in Anselm of Canterbury. According to Anselm,
divine justice demands that humanity render perpetual honour to God. When humanity
adultery be punished with the loss of both eyes. When his own son was caught in adultery and brought to
be blinded, Zaleucus plucked out his son’s first eye, then plucked out one of his own. Thus ‘he conceded to
the law the due measure of punishment, while with an admirable tempering of equity he divided himself
between the merciful father and the just lawgiver.’ What Zaleucus did for the finite crime of one, Christ did
for the infinite sin of all – or at least all who believe in his substitutionary Atonement.
36
One might point out that in IBP II.20.7.2-3, pp. 963-5, Grotius permits capital punishment. Yet even
here, he seems to justify it according to forward-looking purposes. See Geddert, Hugo Grotius, p. 124.
37
For a counterpoint, see Henk Nellen, Hugo Grotius: A Lifelong Struggle for Peace in Church and State,
1583-1645 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), pp. 237-8.
38
IBP II.20.4.2, p. 958.
39
See Blom, ‘Grotius and Socinianism,’ pp. 130, 136.
40
Nellen, Hugo Grotius, p. 237.

9
sins, humanity fails to do so, and by missing this payment (so to speak), incurs a debt of
honour. What is more, these sinful demerits of honour-payment are taken from an
infinite God, meaning that the debt is infinite. Humanity cannot repay it, and thus stands
consigned to a hellish debtor’s prison.
Aquinas then further develops the satisfaction theory. Together with Anselm, he
argues that Christ – unlike sinful humanity – offers perpetual honour to God.
Fortunately, Christ also does more than this, by voluntarily submitting to passion and
death. In doing so, Aquinas argues that Christ gives to God more honour ‘than what was
required to compensate for the offense of the human race’, and thus earns infinite
merits.41 Christ then renounces his own claim on these merits, and God subsequently
applies this heavenly treasury to the church. Those who receive the sacraments of the
church reap this reward, in which Christ’s infinite surplus of merits is applied against
their infinite debt.
The Anselm-Aquinas view appears to be a rather mathematical approach: the merits
earned by Christ are applied exactly to the demerits of each person who joins the church.
By comparison, Grotius appears a deviation from a catholic view that (to this point) deals
in the necessity of mathematics rather than the free will of prudential judgment. Yet
Aquinas then introduces an element of that very judgment into what might otherwise
appear a necessitarian ‘exact correspondence’ theory. He argues that the passion and
death of Christ was not, in fact, the only way to atone for sin. The Atonement was ‘both
good and befitting the Divine dignity.’ The terms ‘good’ and ‘befitting’ connote not a
paradigm of deontological necessity but of teleology. Aquinas continues, ‘other possible
means were not lacking on God’s part’. Aquinas even suggests in a Eucharistic hymn
(‘Adoro te devote’) that one drop of blood from the infinitely perfect Christ would have
sufficed to atone for human sin. Nonetheless, if Aquinas does not believe that Christ’s
death was the only way to save humanity, he does believe that Christ’s passion and death
was the best or most fitting way to save humanity – and to maintain the ‘divine dignity’
so central to Grotius’s aptly-named ‘governmental’ theory.42 In this way, Aquinas
chooses virtually the same reasoning as Grotius would later employ.
Throughout his work, Aquinas repeats this language of fit (conveniens),43 and then
echoes this distinction between the minimum necessary punishment and the best possible
one. In particular, he maps this distinction onto his treatments of necessity and of
satisfaction. In regard to necessity, he does so by considering the question of whether it
was necessary for Christ to become Incarnate in the flesh. To answer, he first states that
the term ‘necessary’ can mean two things. First, a thing is necessary when ‘the end
cannot be without it’: food is necessary for human survival. Second, a thing is necessary
when ‘the end is attained better and more conveniently’: a horse is necessary for a
journey.44 Only the latter type of necessity applies to the Incarnation. The Incarnation
was not the only way to restore human nature, but it was the best way to do so. It best
strengthened human faith, hope, and charity; it gave a dignity to embodied humanity; and
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it showed the Resurrection power of overcoming death.45 It is odd that Aquinas should
even use the term ‘necessity’ to refer to this category. Instead of classifying these two
categories as species of the genus ‘necessity’, he might more easily have distinguished
two genera: ‘necessity’ and ‘fit’. Perhaps he does so in order to show the necessity that
the agent (in this case, God) prudently determine the best fit, much like Grotius would
argue.
Aquinas also uses this distinction between the minimum necessary punishment and the
best possible one to explore Christ’s satisfaction in the Atonement. Here he argues that
only the perfect Christ could offer satisfaction for human sin against God. Yet ‘God was
not bound to satisfy’.46 God’s divine economy did not demand Christ’s death as a matter
of strict necessity; he could have simply consigned all of humanity to eternal perdition.
But Christ’s death allowed the possibility of eternal felicity, which – while not necessary
– is surely the most fitting outcome.
One might attempt to argue that Aquinas’s non-necessitarian approach paves the way
for Socinus. After all, if one avers that Christ’s death is not the exact correspondence to
human sin, then one could say that Christ’s death was not strictly necessary. But for
Aquinas, Christ’s death is yet required by the standards of teleology – a point on which
Grotius would later agree. It is only when one takes a non-necessitarian approach, and
then excises its teleology, that one prepares the way to eliminate satisfaction.47
3. Grotius’s Predestined Practical Failure in Counter-Remonstrant Holland
Grotius’s defence of Christian orthodoxy did not persuade his intellectual or popular
Counter-Remonstrant adversaries. Holland may have commissioned the young Grotius as
its official historiographer, but this honour had clearly purchased for Grotius only fleeting
political and cultural capital. Grotius shortly found himself on trial, facing execution. He
would be officially unwelcome in his home country for the remainder of his life.
This rejection of Grotius should not be surprising; it was almost foreordained. Grotius
was writing in a country that had only in 1581 declared itself a republic and had only in
the Twelve Years’ Truce of 1609 won de facto independence from its Catholic Spanish
masters. Its sovereign independence would not be assured until the 1648 Peace of
Münster. A country with unrecognized rule (and thus unrecognized freedom of
Protestant practice) was surely in little mood to embrace a position of equivalent
satisfaction borrowed from Aquinas, whose spirit had permeated the CounterReformational Council of Trent. On the contrary, a defense of identical satisfaction
would promote both a catholic position and a stronger distinctiveness from the Roman
church, thus further asserting a pious yet distinct Dutch identity. It is not entirely
surprising that the Synod of Dort was soon followed by renewed hostilities with Spain in
Bohemia, which helped to precipitate the Thirty Years’ War.
In this context, the various principles of Counter-Remonstrant Calvinism were almost
predestined to defeat their Remonstrant Grotian adversaries in a war of words. The first
unpopular Grotian principle was the embrace of the natural virtue of prudence, one he
shared with Aquinas. Grotius did agree with the Counter-Remonstrants in rejecting – or
45
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at least rejecting as essential – many Thomistic theological developments, such as the
treasury of merits or venial and mortal sins. But in De satisfactione, he embraced the
Aristotelian virtue of prudence so central to Aquinas’s political thought. Where Aquinas
had implied this natural virtue in his concept of equivalent satisfaction, Grotius made it
explicit. By employing pagan philosophy and natural virtues to supplement his Scriptural
exegesis, he sought a ground of reason procedurally acceptable and neutral to all, even to
unbelievers.
Yet this embrace of Aristotle would not endear Grotius to his Remonstrant audience.
Aristotle’s thought had earned deep criticism from Calvin, as well as many an
antagonistic polemic during the development of Reformed orthodoxy.48 The very
concept of a natural virtue attainable by natural human effort would be off-putting to
Grotius’s audience. But Grotius would further portray God’s prudence as co-equal with
his love. This would do even less to commend his argument to an audience for whom
‘there was no easy alliance between philosophy and theology’.49 Even Gale, the major
Reformed figure most friendly to philosophy, and one whose method Grotius in some
ways followed in De veritate, argued that ends of philosophy were inadmissible.50
It is true that the Dutch Republic saw a revival of scholasticism during the
development of Reformed orthodoxy, beginning around the turn of the seventeenth
century. Yet this revival refers more to the institutionalization and professionalization of
Reformed doctrine than to any attempt to reconcile the content of pagan philosophy with
Christianity. As Muller notes, ‘the term “scholasticism,” when applied to these efforts
indicates primarily, therefore, a method and not a particular content’.51 While its chief
thinkers embraced the methods and logic of scholasticism (and their Aristotelian
inspiration), they did not embrace Aristotle’s metaphysics or ethics, which were thought
to be fatally flawed. Hence, Grotius’s frequent citation of pagan philosophy would not be
seen favourably as evidence for the universality of proto-Christian themes. Rather, it
would be taken as evidence of a prideful belief in philosophy. What is more, such a
position could be seen to criticize events such as the iconoclastic 1566 Beeldenstorm that
had helped to galvanize the Dutch revolt, and thus by extension impugn the founding
sentiments of the republic.
Second, the Counter-Remonstrant doctrine of limited atonement was perhaps also
predestined to outdo in popularity Grotius’s concept of unlimited atonement in De
satisfactione. Grotius sees Christ as bearing punishment on behalf of human sin in
general, not simply the sin of those individuals elected by God. This means that all can
potentially attain salvation, if they will only profess faith in Christ and be baptized into
the church. Once again, Grotius may take issue with the specific Roman doctrines of
penance, purgatory, indulgence, and merits, but he implicitly endorses its idea of
potential salvation for the entire church. This could be seen to legitimize the claimed
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faith of Roman Catholic masses across Europe, a position unlikely to appeal to Grotius’s
Counter-Remonstrant opponents. To them, the Atonement could not be available to all,
even in a purely theoretical sense; it demands that some people – even perhaps most
people – must be punished.52 An Atonement theology promising salvation only to a few
implicitly reinforced the political spirit of a small republic. By contrast, Grotius’s
approach (on its face) seemed to give comfort to Roman Christendom, and thus to
Spanish legitimacy in the low countries.
Finally, Calvin’s use of commercial Atonement language was likely to outdo Grotius’s
political language of equivalent satisfaction. Calvin speaks of a Christ who ‘paid our
ransom’ and who ‘purchased…grace for us’, and thus satisfied ‘by that price the justice
of God.’53 Such formulations may not demand identical satisfaction, but they certainly
seem to imply it. What is more, virtually all Reformed orthodox would later avoid
categorizing the discipline of theology as prudentia, as the Remonstrants had asserted.
This rejection further de-emphasized the idea of (Aristotelian) prudence even as an
appropriate method of theology, let alone as central to its content.54 By contrast, Grotius
speaks of an equivalence ascertained through prudence. In doing so, he emphasizes a
concept that is not simple and intuitive, but difficult to define and thus generally less
persuasive to the casual reader. The natural mass desire for clarity over subtlety was
undoubtedly exacerbated in Grotius’s time and place by the wars roiling the Continent.
When basic survival is threatened, whether physical, psychological or theological, few
have the inclination to take up positions that naturally form a poor battle cry. The
necessitarian idea that Christ paid one’s exact debt or took on one’s exact punishment
surely feels far more immediately satisfying than the subtlety of a position in which
Christ suffers as the best (rather than the only) substitute, or one in which he suffers for
the less tangible sins of ‘humanity in general’. Such subtlety is not conducive to a wide
reception in a time of conflict.
4. Grotius’s Successful Reception in Britain
Yet there is one country that avoided these infertile conditions for the Grotian seed:
Britain. Only here did the Governmental theory take root. Grotius’s connections across
the Channel were widespread. His visit in 1613 was crucial in helping to establish
Arminianism in Britain. During that sojourn he had contact with Lancelot Andrews and
John Overall, not to mention King James I himself. Undeterred by their deaths shortly
after his own exile, Grotius set about cultivating new English connections: Archbishop
Laud and the Wren brothers. Grotius’s love of Britain was never fully reciprocated, as
few (other than Laud in 1640) would take risks to help a needy Grotius.55 But Britain
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nonetheless gave Grotius’s Atonement theology a fair hearing. And if Grotius’s ideas did
not blossom there into a mighty oak, they did at least produce several brilliant flowers.
It is true, of course, that De satisfactione lacked – in Britain as elsewhere – the reach
of other Atonement theories, such as those of Anselm-Aquinas or Calvin. Its direct
lineage was limited by its modest three translations in English. Yet even these three
English editions exceeded the combined total in other languages. Moreover, Latin
editions of De satisfactione had already appeared in Britain by 1636, predating all other
Latin editions outside Holland by a century. England also produced the majority of
foreign translations of De veritate and the Annotationes.56
Likewise, one must concede the paucity of literature on the subsequent history of
Atonement theology, especially concerning its popular reception.57 Yet it is possible to
establish a lineage in Britain through three well-studied and influential English
theologians who adopted Grotius’s theory in part or in full.58 Tracing this theological
lineage does not simply establish a continuity of Grotian tradition and reception, but also
shows a connection between the Grotian Atonement and the British ‘middle way’
approach, as each of the three figures rejected a strict and ossified concept of tradition yet
affirmed and preached a Christianity that Grotius would deem ‘catholic’. This
historiography also shows a consistent misperception of such nuanced thinkers among
their contemporary audiences, but unlike on the Continent, not one fatal to their
continued reception.
Richard Baxter
One of the first prominent English theologians to espouse a form of the governmental
theory was the seventeenth-century preacher, hymnist, and theologian Richard Baxter
(1615-91). Baxter was a Puritan in regard to ecclesiology (if not theology), yet he
persistently sought a peaceful middle way, while declaring himself (like Grotius) a
catholic Christian. He helped to popularize the saying of Grotius’s correspondent de
Dominis, ‘in fundamentals unity, in non-fundamentals liberty, in all things charity.’59
Baxter found no joy in the approaching 1642 Civil War, and blamed its cause on
Parliament no less than the monarchy. He did ultimately join the Parliamentary army, but
for an unusual reason: namely, to redirect (from within) its radical republican aims
toward constitutional monarchy. Unsurprisingly, he earned enemies on both sides, and
he ultimately found himself (like Grotius) behind bars. Yet his influence continued for
centuries in Britain, as his devotional work was popular for generations, and Max Weber
cited him extensively to illustrate the Protestant Ethic.
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Baxter wrote that he had ‘learnt more from Grotius than from almost any writer that I
ever read’, and his Atonement theory reflects this patrimony.60 Baxter defines
satisfaction not in terms of an ‘exact correspondence’ theory, but rather as broadly
attaining the ends of the law. Hence, Christ’s death demonstrates justice, and preserves
the authority of the Divine lawgiver.61 In fact, Baxter implies that only if we see God as
a governor can we render the Kingdom of God fully intelligible.62 Baxter did later
respectfully break with Grotius over Grotius’s quest to reunite Christendom through
Rome (after years of failed efforts through Canterbury).63 Yet Grotius’s hoped-for global
Christian unity was ironically only an extension of the English unity for which Baxter
himself had toiled and suffered; Baxter seems to have opposed the plan out of an onlyslightly-incomplete Grotian spirit.64
John Wesley
Perhaps the most famous Grotian sympathizer was the eighteenth-century preacher,
writer, and church leader John Wesley (1703-91). Wesley was an itinerant preacher and
leader of the Great Awakening, although he temporarily split with his co-leader George
Whitefield over the latter’s belief in predestination. Like the Puritan Baxter, Wesley was
uncomfortable with the strictures of Anglican ecclesiology. Yet also like Baxter, Wesley
sought an inclusive theological middle way that would unite rather than divide. He
eventually reconciled with Whitefield, and preached a sermon at Whitefield’s funeral in
which he used (and may have coined) the phrase ‘agree to disagree’.65 What is more,
with his brother Charles he consistently rejected pressure from his followers to leave the
Anglican communion, and likewise urged his English followers to remain.
Although Wesley’s Atonement theology is difficult to pin down conclusively, at
minimum he sees Christ not simply as atoning God’s wrath but also his justice. What is
more, Wesley explicitly states that Christ, in dying, does not suffer the exact punishment
due to every sinner. These two ideas are clearly Grotian, so it is not surprising that
Wesley went out of his way to recommend Grotius to others.66 Indeed, even when
Wesley hesitates to mandate one specific theory to the exclusion of others, he reflects
Grotius’s refusal to directly criticize Aquinas or Calvin.
Wesley was also highly active in prison reform. British criminal law and practice
eventually came to bear marks of his Grotian influence. British law reflected God’s
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positive command of damnation: the law was often severe, mandating capital punishment
for many crimes. Yet British judges echoed God’s penal relaxation, or what Grotius calls
‘indulgence’ or ‘moderation’.67 They often applied this law with mercy, offering to
convicted criminals the alternative of exile to the colonies. Furthermore, they often
punished less serious crimes not with hard physical treatment but by employing the
stocks. In doing so, they relaxed the pain of physical punishment, but increased the
public disapprobation of crime – thus testifying to the dignity of the law.68
Wesley’s religious descendants in America further carried the torch for the
Governmental theory, through the intermediary of the New Divinity School of Jonathan
Edwards, Jr. Adherents of this school sought a middle way between the Penal
Substitution theory of Westminster Confession Old Calvinists, and the Moral Influence
theory of proto-Unitarian Liberals. Moreover, much like Grotius, they were attacked by
both sides for doing so.69 This New Divinity school was a natural fit for Wesleyan
Methodists in the nineteenth century. Beginning in the 1830s, they often promulgated the
Governmental theory in their periodicals and propounded it from their pulpits. By the
1860s, they had extended the idea of God’s moral government beyond the Atonement, to
the entirely of God’s work throughout the universe. Unsurprisingly, this approach has a
continued lineage today among ‘mediating Methodists’, who seek to balance God’s
jurisprudence and love, and who embrace Divine mystery over detailed dogma.70
P. T. Forsyth
The Grotian legacy was carried into twentieth-century Britain by P. T. Forsyth (18481921). Forsyth was described in 1925 by J. K. Mozley as England’s most powerful
dogmatic theologian, even though Forsyth preferred aphorism and critiqued oversystematization in theology. Emil Brunner publicly praised Forsyth as the greatest of
British theologians (while adopting his Grotian approach to the Atonement). Karl Barth
spoke warmly of Forsyth, and transmitted these implicit Grotian themes to his own wide
audience.71
In the Justification of God, Forsyth questions Anselm’s legal-juridical model and
instead sees the Atonement as redressing ‘the whole moral fabric and movement of the
universe.’ What calls for redress is not God’s stock of honour, but the rightness of
things.72 He also places teleology above ‘exact correspondence’ necessity: as one reader
notes, ‘what fell on [Christ] was not the equivalent punishment of sin but its due
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condemnation.’73 Yet nor did Forsyth insist that that one type of metaphor could fully
capture the Atonement.74 Forsyth also echoed Grotius by critiquing of the Council of
Chalcedon without adhering to the position it outlawed. Instead, like Grotius he
protested its process of defining a narrow doctrine, one which produced a schism in the
church (and one that Patriarch Meletius, honoured by Grotius, later sought to heal).
Forsyth’s Grotian affinity resulted in a Grotian-style reception. Forsyth was critiqued
by conservative Protestants for embracing historical-critical scholarship and rejecting
propositional orthodoxy, and by liberals for his emphasis on sin, judgment, and a
personal encounter with the Revealer. One might say that he alienated both sides by
employing the methods of liberalism for the objectives of catholic Christianity, much as
Jeremy Thomas describes Grotius as having been ‘orthodox for all the wrong reasons’.75
Furthermore, much like Grotius, Forsyth was charged with being difficult to read, in his
case because of an aphoristic style born of his suspicion with systematic theology.76 Yet
his dissemination through theological giants like Barth and Brunner has ensured the
continuation of his Grotian legacy.
Grotius and the English Way
If this brief survey has shown that England was the country best disposed toward
Grotius’s theology of punishment, it helps to vindicate recent speculation over Grotius’s
particular Christian allegiance. Thomas argues that Grotius ‘probably found the Anglican
Church…the most attractive’.77 Certainly Grotius’s position on church and state fits the
Church of England; Grotius expected James I to welcome his Erastian view. Hugh
Trevor-Roper more confidently asserts that Grotius was ‘in foro interno [an] Anglican to
the end’. He points out that Grotius praised the Anglican liturgy, saying ‘it has always
been held by all learned men to be the best.’ He also mentions that Grotius advised his
wife and children to communicate in the Anglican church in Paris, and would have joined
them himself if not limited by his ambassadorship of Lutheran Sweden.78
There are several good reasons why Grotius’s emphasis on the peaceful, nondogmatic
middle way drew him to the Anglican Way – and why his theological legacy should have
found a welcome home there. The English Reformation differed from that of the
Continent, as it was not initially prompted by doctrinal disputes over justification (and
thus satisfaction). Rather, it was motivated more by non-doctrinal issues such as abuse of
indulgences, Roman oversight, and the Latin mass. For this reason, it sought not to
define a narrow doctrine but to accommodate all who professed a broadly catholic
Christianity – from moderate Calvinists to high church Laudians. This spirit of Grotian
catholicity befits its emphasis that truth is discerned in practice more than theory. For
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example, the greatest Anglican conflicts have typically not involved doctrine but practice,
especially the Prayer Book: a liturgy that contains little explicit theology but much that is
implicit.
The Anglican ‘middle way’, with its emphasis on praxis, in turn reflects the broader
political culture and history of Britain. One English distinctive is the usage of common
law rather than Roman civil law. This approach prioritizes situational discernment over
universal principles. Correspondingly, England’s principle of Parliamentary Supremacy
and its absence of judicial review leads its government to ‘muddle through’ conflicts
rather than resolving them in black-and-white judicial rulings. As a result, the English
constitution – like the English garden – develops slowly over time, unlike the planned
French constitution (and garden). Likewise, Brits have traditionally fought for the ‘rights
of Englishmen’ that are won over time (as in Edmund Burke) rather than universal rights
that descend from on high (as in Thomas Paine). This concept of rights further buttresses
the ‘slow but sure’ English approach to change, obviating the need for the many
revolutions of its Gallic neighbor; Britain’s revolution was Glorious (because peaceful).
Unsurprisingly, Brits tend to have a more positive attitude toward their government and
the dignified functions of the monarchy that serve even today as Grotian ‘Protector of the
Faith’.79 For these reasons, we should not be surprised to find theological descendants of
Grotius in Britain.
Conclusion: De Satisfactione – Only Satisfying to Grotius’s Posthumous Audience
Grotius’s Atonement theory failed to persuade at least three audiences. First, it failed to
persuade his contemporary Counter-Remonstrant adversaries; they viewed it as windowdressing for Popery or heresy. Second, his theory has failed to win over scholars today;
they often see it as a bridge to Socinus. Nor, finally, did the Governmental theory
convict pastors or parishioners in Holland, let alone wider Continental Europe;
congregations there have largely chosen from the stark binary of Anselm-Aquinas or
Calvin.
Yet the theory’s cool reception need not disprove its catholic purport or its defense of
substitutionary Atonement. Indeed, its use of methods that can potentially appeal to all
who consider themselves catholic may have been its very undoing. First, its lack of clear
opposition to Roman doctrine may have rendered it less appealing to the Dutch audience
of the 1610s, offering less implicit support to a nascent Dutch republic independent of
Spain. Second, its implicit Thomistic concept of equivalent rather than identical
satisfaction has led many scholars to overemphasize its affinity with Socinus. Finally, its
foundation on a nuanced jurisprudence rather than on clear theology or principles of sola
scriptura likely rendered it unappealing to congregants in Continental pews. In short,
Grotius’s Governmental theory may have been catholic, but it was likely too subtle to
satisfy many. Because he declined to use necessitarian language that clearly refuted the
Roman adversary, his theory may have been ill-suited to a time of war, and thus almost
predestined to perdition. Its posthumous salvation came from England, the one country
largely spared from religious and political strife – although at the time of Grotius’s death
even Britain would not have looked hopeful. If Grotius truly ended his life with words
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about having attempted many things and having accomplished few of them, he could
have been forgiven for the sentiment.
The argument and reception of De satisfactione seems a microcosm of Grotius’s
tireless (and generally fruitless) lifelong quest for peace. In his Atonement theology,
Grotius sought a basis agreeable to all parties, without necessarily forcing either side to
repudiate their own. Yet despite reaching out to both sides on a neutral ground, he found
himself distrusted by both; the more he defended himself from ‘Socinianism’ or ‘Popery’
(and the more he declined their enticing offers), the more he became accused of both.80
While he sought a peaceful middle way, his opponents found it easier to divide and
conquer. His rivals’ strategy was well-suited to a public that sought tangible, intuitive
doctrines; indeed, their emphasis on the language of necessity rather than prudence is
often a winner even today.81 Few audiences embrace Grotius’s emphasis on diversity in
inessentials, or his belief in the inability of words to fully convey the mystery of Christ –
a man Divine but never fully defined. Yet perhaps Grotius employs such nuance not to
disingenuously enable heterodoxy but rather to prevent catholic Christianity from
becoming ossified into brittle propositional dogma. Much like Christ’s death permits a
prudent alteration of God’s original (positive) command, Grotius’s emphasis on practice
over doctrine points toward a transcendent and personal God who acts – in the words of
De satisfactione – ‘not according to the law, yet not against it; but rather, above the law,
and instead of it.’82 Only in a more pacific context, one more amenable to careful and
subtle philosophical inquiry, could this delicate and long-germinating Atonement theory
begin to flower.
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